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IN ~HE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE •OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
the Personal Representative 
with Will Annexed of the 
Estate of Penelope Kopoulos, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HELEN CHLEPAS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16787 
Plaintiff, as the Personal Representative with Will 
annexed of the Estate of Penelope Kopoulos, brings this action 
to determine the ownership of two certificates of deposit issued 
in the name of the deceased, Penelope Kopoulos, and defendant, 
Helen Chelpas, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Judge, Honorable Dean E. Conder, sitting 
without a jury, found the issues in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff. The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and based thereon, entered a Judgment 
awarding defendant the certificates of deposit free and clear of 
any claim by the estate. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of that Judgment and 
entry of a Judgment by this Court directing that the estate is 
entitled to ownership of the certificates of deposit free and 
clear of any claim of ownership by defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Penelope Kopoulos was 78 years old when she died on 
February 24, 1977. She was born in Greece and immigrated to the 
United States prior to 1934. She had an eighth grade education 
and could neither speak nor read the English language. (Tr. 66-68) 
She was married to George Kopoulos, also a Greek immigrant, who 
died on August 21, 1973. Mr. Kopoulos had been a Salt Lake City 
businessman and was educated in the English language. During his 
lifetime Mr. Kopoulos handled the family affairs. The parties had 
accumulated some savings accounts and owned and resided in the home 
located at 446 Denver Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Title to the 
home was in joint tenancy. 
Mr. Alke T. Diamant, a Salt Lake City lawyer, fluent 
in the Greek language, had represented the Kopouloses since 1934. 
In 1966 he prepared joint Wills. After the death of her husband, 
Mr. Diamant continued his representation of Mrs. Kopoulos. This 
included handling the estate matters. In view of her illiteracy 
with the English language, Mr. Diamant found it necessary for him 
to converse with Mrs. Kopoulos in Greek language. When he prepared 
the joint Will and terminated the estate of her husband, he would 
translate the documents from English into Greek. Also, he would 
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then explain in the Greek language the legal ramifications of 
what she was signing. 
Approximately a year after her husband's death, Mrs. 
Kopoulos decided to sell the family home and reside in a rest 
home. Mr. Diamant represented the deceased by negotiating the 
sales price for the property and reviewing and preparing the 
necessary documents needed to complete the sale. In this trans-
action, all of the papers were written in English. However, Mr. 
Diamant followed his customary procedure by explaining to Mrs. 
Kopoulos in the Greek language the meaning of the documents and 
their legal effect. The sale of the property was completed on 
November 14, 1974. On that date a meeting with Mrs. Kopoulos and 
defendant was held in Mr. Diamant's office. During the meeting 
the results of the sale of the property was discussed, and Mr. 
Diamant delivered to Mrs. Kopoulos two checks totaling the amount 
of $60,942.14. (Exhibit 8) During this meeting, Mr. Diamant 
continued his role of being lawyer and adviser for Mrs. Kopoulos 
by recommending that she protect these funds by purchasing long-
term savings account certificates. The Kopouloses had other 
joint savings accounts, including a small account at the American 
Savings & Loan Association. Mr. Diamant also recommended that the 
other savings account, together with a small amount of the proceeds 
of the sale of the home, be placed in a joint checking account with 
Mrs. Chelpas. The purpose of the joint account was for the con-
venience of the deceased in having Mrs. Chelpas write the necessary 
checks needed for payment of her living expenses. It was the plan 
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that her Social Security benefits, together with the interest 
from the old and new savings certificates, would be deposited 
in this account for the living expenses of the deceased. Mrs. 
Kopoulos followed his advice and invested the greater portion 
of the funds received from the sale of her home by purchasing 
two certificates of deposit from the American Savings & Loan 
Association in the face value of $50,000.00 and $10.000.00, 
respectively. Each certificates was issued in the names of 
Penelope Kopoulos and Helen Chelpas, as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship. (Exhibits 6, 7) Further, a joint checking 
account was opened at Valley Bank & Trust Company, Broadway office. 
Mrs. Kopoulos, complying with the advice and counsel 
of Mr. Diamant, made arrangements with the American Savings & 
Loan Association for the quarterly payment of the interest on 
the respective certificates. She received these payments until 
the date of her death. 
Mrs. Kopoulos spent the remainder of her life residing 
in four local rest homes. During this period of time, Mrs. Kopoulos 
would converse with Mr. Diamant by telephone on the average of at 
least once a month. These calls were initiated by Mrs. Kopoulos, 
and while they discussed personal matters, the main reason for the 
calls was for an appointment with Mr. Diamant for the purpose of 
preparing a Will. (Tr. 78) Such a meeting finally occurred on 
February 13, 1977 while the deceased was residing at the Meadow-
brook Rest Home, Murray, Utah. Mrs. Kopoulos initially advised 
Mr. Diamant she had instructed the defendant to destroy the prior 
joint Will prepared by Mr. Diamarc'· 
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Will be prepared for her, and the names of the devisees and the 
amount of each bequest are reflected in the notes of Mr. Diamant. 
(Exhibit 9) The total of the intended bequests exceeded the sum 
of $76,000.00. (Tr. 81-84) 
Plaintiff submits this meeting was very critical and 
supports our position that Mrs. Kopoulos never considered Mrs. 
Chlepas to be a joint owner of the two savings certificates. The 
important portion of the testimony which reflects such conclusion 
is contained on Pages 82 and 88 of the transcript. The pertinent 
portions of the transcript commence on Page 82 and are as follows: 
(Tr. 82) 
"Q. Was there any talk about that other will? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. What did she say? 
A. I asked her again, I said, "You sure that--" "Yes. " 
Said, "I gave it to Helen. I told her to tear it up." So help me 
God! That's what she said. 
Q. And now, what were the further conversations? 
A. Further conversation is I want to draw the will. 
And I said, "Now, are you sure you have all this money?" I said, 
"You know how much money you gave me." And I said, "Now, has 
Helen showed you any books? "No." "Has Helen drawn any money?" 
Says, "My Social security and the interest has been enough up to 
now to pay for my keep." 
Q. Now, does that exhibit that you have there in your 
hand, Mr. Diamant, reflect a note that you made at the time? 
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A. This is the information and in the Greek language. 
And I was asking her, I was putting these notes that nobody can 
read but myself I guess." (The notes were later admitted into 
evidence as Exhibit 9) 
And at Tr. 84: 
"* * * And I said, "Oh, wait a minute." I added these 
up and they were over $76, 000. 00 •. I said, "Now, you sure all of 
that money is in there?" Said, "You know how much money you gave 
me, and how much money I had from George. " And then she said, "I 
want you to be the executor of my estate." I said, "I would feel 
better, so people wouldn't think I will take advantage of you." 
I said, "Helen is a good lady. She's your Godchild. Why don't 
you make her jointly with me." And says, "All right. You and 
Helen act as the co-executors of my estate." Then I asked her, 
I said, "Penelope, are you sure you have all of this money?" Said, 
"Well, Helen has not used any money except the interest." I said, 
"Has she shown you any records?" "No." "Do you have any books? 
"No." I said, "Before I go ahead and draw the will, you better 
contact Helen Chlepas and have her bring the books." Says, I will 
do it Monday, and I will call you." I didn't hear anything Monday." 
Mr. Diamant then testified: (Tr. 84) 
"Tuesday she called me up and said, '•Helen came and 
brought me one book." And I says, noid you ask her about the 
books?n "Yeah." "What did she tell you?" 11 I don't know." And 
I said, "You talked to her and if she didn't bring you the books"' 
I says, "I will get into the matter." And that was the last con-
versation I had with the lady unt~~ 
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said, and that was I think the 24th, I wouldn't swear. It's 
either that day and said, "Penelope died." And I said, "My God! 
When I saw her on the 13th she was so happy and was satisfied, 
and contented. And she felt because she was a cripple, she felt 
so well." I said, "What happened?" Says, "I don't know. She 
died." 
In response to further questioning, the witness testified: 
{Tr. 85) 
"Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) Any conversation between you and 
Mrs. Kapoulis about joint tenancy with Helen? 
A. There was no joint tenancy. The conversation--
MR. HINTZE: Objection. That's nonresponsive, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) Was there any conversation? 
A. Yes. There was a conversation. 
Q. What was that? 
A. The conversation is, this money in your name? Says, 
"li .. bsolutely. You gave it to me." Says, '"A.11 Helen is getting is 
the interest and pays the bills." And I said, "Have you paid her 
anything?" Says, "Not up to now." But says, "I will. I will be 
very happy to." 
And at Tr. 105, 106: 
"Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) You had some conversations with 
her about how the money was being held, is that correct? 
A. Right. 
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MR. HINTZE: Your Honor, I object to it as 
inunaterial and improper redirect examination. 
THE COURT: Well, may be, but you will ask 
leave to reopen and we'll get back to the same place. Objection 
overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) Now, in your conversations in 
discussing bank accounts and other matters, was the word joint 
tenancy ever used? 
A. No. * * *" 
After her death, probate proceedings were initiated in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Probate No. 64059. The Court, upon Motion of counsel 
for defendant, marked the file as Exhbi t 3D and took judicial notice 
of the contents of the file. That file will reflect that decedent's 
sister, a resident of Greece, requested a local resident to file 
a Petition for appointment as Personal Representative of the de-
ceased. After such appointment, the named Executor of the 1967 
Will executed by the deceased, filed the Will for Probate and 
petitioned for his appointment as Executor. After a hearing, the 
Will was admitted to Probate. However, the named Executor was 
the brother of the defendant, and the Court thereupon disqualified 
him as Executor of the estate and subsequently appointed the Valley 
Bank & Trust Company as the Personal Representative of the estate 
with Will annexed. 
Thereafter, the defendant, as the surviving joint tenant, 
claimed title to the savings certificates. Plaintiff, as the 
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Personal Representative then initiated this action to have the 
court enter a Judgment that the two certificates were not a true 
joint account and were assets of the estate. The Trial Court 
entered Judgment in favor of defendant, and it is the entry of 
that Judgment which is the subject of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT.I: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY 
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT THAT ARE 
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
At the outset, plaintiff acknowledges that §75-6-105(1), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is applicable to this case. 
The appropriate portion of the aforementioned statute states: 
"Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a 
party to a joint account belong to the surviving 
party or parties as against the estate of the de-
cedent unless there is a clear and convincing evi-
dence of a different intention at the time the 
account is created." 
Plaintiff contends the Trial Court erred in determining 
whether plaintiff had met the burden set forth in the above statute. 
Plaintiff submits the Trial Judge, in analyzing the evidence, failed 
to follow the dictates of this Court as stated in McCullough v. 
Wasserback, 518 P.2d 691, 30 U.2d 398. In that case, the Trial 
Court found in favor of the estate and against the surviving joint 
tenant. While this Court reversed that ruling and entered a Judg-
ment in favor of the surviving joint tenant, in so doing, this 
Court ruled that evidence in these types of cases generally falls 
within two specific categories. These categories were defined as 
follows: 
-9-
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"The principal difficulty in writing any 
simple and definitive rule which will fit all 
cases is that the complexities of human life and 
personalities are such that no two fact situations 
are exactly alike. But they usually can be found 
as tending to fall into one of two general but 
contrasting patterns. 
An elderly person, call him A, is increasinly 
in need of attention and care. Someone, call him 
X, (usually a family member) is sensitive of his 
needs and assumes some responsibility of filling 
them. As part of the total circumstances, and 
perhaps for a syndrome of reasons, including 
gratitude, love and convenience, A creates a joint 
bank account with the actual desire and intent of 
endowing X with co-ownership and right of survivor-
ship in the funds. After the demise of A, and the 
problem of care and attention no longer exists, 
others come forward to make their claims. In 
situations tending to fit into this general pat-
tern it is obvious that a trial court's sense of 
fairness and human decency does and should impel 
him to tend to favor the caring person X, and to 
reject attacks upon his surviving ownership in the 
joint account. 
It must be realized that there are other con-
trasting situations where one's sense of justice 
is affected differently. Elderly person B is also 
in need of attention and care. Yet there may be 
no genuinely caring person to whom B actually 
desires to give joint ownership of his bank account. 
In any event, for his own reasons, and perhaps for 
a combination of them, his true desire is to retain 
ownership himself. But solely because of necessity 
and/or convenience in handling his money and affairs, 
and with that definite understanding, he creates a 
joint account with someone else {usually a family 
member) Y; and it also quite often appears in such 
a situation that there is some indication of avarice 
of varyine hues in the survivor Y. In cases which 
tend to fit into this latter pattern it is but 
natural and proper that the same sense of justice 
and human decency both does and should impel the 
court to be more inclined to grant equitable relief 
from enforcement of the contract." 
The Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Judge clearly 
indicate the Court neglected to analyze the evidence in accordance 
with the above decision. Therefo requests 
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this Court to re-examine the record to insure that an equitable 
and just Judgment was entered in the case. 
POINT II: THE FINDINGS OF FACT ENTERED BY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE ARE CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE REASONABLE IN-
FERENCES TO BE DRAWN THEREFROM. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the record before this 
Court established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the de-
ceased, Penelope Kopoulos, never intended to create a joint account 
with the defendant in the two savings certificates. Plaintiff 
urged before the Trial Court that due to the deceased's infirmity 
regarding the language problem, when coupled with the subsequent 
acts and conduct of the deceased, established the deceased was 
never fully apprised of the contents of the documents which created 
the joint account and could not have appreciated what she was doing. 
Further, that under these circumstances, placing her signature on 
the joint account was done under a mistake as to its legal effect. 
The Trial Court properly found from the evidence in 
Finding of Fact No. 3 (Tr. 37}: 
"During her lifetime, the decedent did not write 
or speak the English language." 
However, contrary to the evidence, the following state-
ment was included: 
"But it was her practice to conduct business 
utilizing the English language by having the 
written documents read and explained to her." 
Plaintiff contends that this last statement is supported 
by the evidence but was not applicable to the facts involved in this 
case. 
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The only evidence bearing on this language issue and 
the business practice of the deceased, is contained in the testi-
mony of Mr. Diamant. The witness testified his understanding of 
the Greek language enabled him to converse with the deceased in 
her unique Greek dialect. The witness noted the dialect was dif-
ficult at times, and often he had trouble reading her Greek letters. 
The witness testified that during the time he represented 
the Kopouloses, he principally dealt with Mr. Kopoulos who was 
familiar with the English language. Mr. Diamant did translate 
the Will executed by the deceased. After the death of Mr. Kopoulos, 
Mr. Diamant continued his representation of Mrs. Kopoulos. This 
representation consisted of handling her husband's estate and 
negotiating the sale of her home and finalizing all of the docu-
ments necessary to complete that sale. While all of his activities 
involved the preparation of documents in the English language, he 
would always translate the documents and explain the legal impli-
cations of these documents in the Greek language. 
There is nothing in the record that indicates the identi~ 
of any other person who ever performed similar tasks for the decease 
Further, there is no testimony which would establish that prior to I 
the purchase of the two savings certificates that Mrs. Kopoulos 
engaged in any business transaction not supervised and controlled 
by Mr. Diamant. 
The defendant was disqualified as a witness under the 
provisions of §78-24-2(3), Utah State Dead Man Statute. However, 
there is no disclosure in the record that defendant was so conver~~ 
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to properly translate the meaning of the words contained in the 
joint account contract. (Exhibits 3, 4) Also, there is no testi-
mony to the effect that defendant was so versed in the legal aspect 
of joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship which would have 
enabled her to adequately explain in the Greek language the meaning 
of the terms and the subsequent legal implications involved in 
establishing a joint tenancy relationship with full rights of 
survivorship. 
Additionally, there is no testimony in the record that 
a qualified Greek linguist from the American Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation explained to the deceased the nature and legal effect of 
the documents that she was signing. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based upon the 
foregoing testimony and state of the record, there was no justi-
fication for the Trial Court to imply the transaction between 
the deceased and the American Savings & Loan Association was fully 
and adequately explained to the deceased in her native language. 
We submit that the Court was not warranted in assuming that by 
virtue of her relationship with her attorney and personal friend, 
Mr. Diamant, that in this isolated transaction, she was afforded 
identical treatment. The logical conclusion from the testimony 
and record before this Court is that unless Mr. Diamant handled 
the business transactions, no one else explained to the deceased 
the reason or legal implications of her actions. 
Plaintiff requests this Court to reject that portion of 
Finding of Fact No. 3 and rule the deceased did not read or speak 
the English language, and the contents of the joint account and the 
-13-
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legal ramifications of the meaning of joint tenancy with full 
rights of survivorship were never fully explained to the deceased 
prior to the creation of the account. 
Plaintiff further objected to the Findings of Fact 
entered by the Trial Court, and in particular, Finding of Fact 
No. 4 which analyzed the effect of the meeting between the deceased 
and Mr. Diamant on February 13, 1977, approximately 13 days before 
her death. The Court in Finding of Fact No. 4 (Tr. 37) acknowled~i 
the existence ofthe meeting, and then stated the testimony only 
11 infers a different intent than manifest on the joint tenancy 
certificates." The Court should have found that the substance 
of the meeting established, by clear and convincing evidence, the 
deceased did not understand what she was signing and, therefore, 
never intended the creation of a joint tenancy account. 
This Court, in McCullough, supra, specifically admonished 
the Trial Court in determining whether or not the contestant had 
met its burden, to consider the "whole evidence" in the case. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the Trial Court failed to consider 
and appreciate the effect of the statements made by the deceased 
/ 
to Mr. Diamant. As previously noted, the deceased, at all times, 
exercised full custody and control over these certificates by 
having the company mail to her the quarterly interest payment. 
(Exhibits 1, 2) In view of this fact, it is clear she never 
would have executed a document which would have permitted the 
defendant to not only withdraw the principal amount from the 
-1 
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account or be considered having authority to retain interest pay-
ments. 
When the Court considers this fact, coupled with the 
strong language she used with Mr. Diamant in asserting true and 
complete ownership of the funds, this established, without question, 
her true intent at the time of the creation of the joint account. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this case is unique 
from other cases presented to this Court for review. Those prior 
decisions cited inthe McCullough case, supra, normally involve a 
situation where the elderly person has all of the normal facualties 
and understanding of the English language to enter into the joint 
account. A Court, under those circumstances, properly concludes 
that the person read and understood the contents of the joint 
account. Unless there were other extenuating circumstances evi-
dencing a different intent, the prior decisions normally affirm 
the creation of the account. However, in the case at bar, due 
to the decedent's infirmity, i.e., illiteracy in the English 
language, the sanctity of the contract is questioned. Therefore, 
the finder of fact should not base the entire decision on the 
contract, but should consider other facts in determining if there 
is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent. 
This Court, in McCullough, supra, stated ,as follows: 
"In considering whether that standard of proof 
has been~met we keep in mind that this is a case 
in equity in which this court may review the facts, 
yet do not lose sight of the prerogatives indulged 
the trial court; that even in equity cases his find-
ings and judgment will not be disturbed unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them and a 
manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. But if 
-15-
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these are seen to exist, this court may make its 
own findings and judgment to supersede those of 
the trial court." 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this case falls 
squarely within the above language. Plaintiff contends that if 
this Court allows defendant the right to retain ownership of the 
two certificates of deposit, this would constitute an injustice 
and frustrate the decedent's true desire. The Judgment entered 
by the Trial Court must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Judgment entered 
by the Trial Court is not supported by the evidence. At the time 
of the creation of the purported joint tenancy in the certificates, 
the evidence clearly shows that the decedent executed the documents 
under a full and complete mistake as to their legal effect. The 
decedent in this case did not intend to creat a joint tenancy 
with the right of survivorship, nor did she desire or endow de-
fendant with co-ownership and right of survivorship in the funds. 
On the contrary, the decedent placed the name of defendant on the 
certificates for her own convenience, and from the date of purchase, 
up to and including the date of her death, it was her belief that 
she had retained ownership of these certificates. 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff requests this 
Court to reverse the Judgment and enter Judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICP..ARD C. DIBBLEE, of 
Roberts, Black & Dibblee 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Harold A. Hintze, Attorney for 
defendant-respondent, 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 21st day of February, 1980. 
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